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Should countries follow counter-cyclical or pro-cyclical monetary policies? This
paper documents that in contrast to developed economies, developing countries tend
to follow pro-cyclical monetary policies. The paper then constructs a New-Keynesian
small open economy model with wage rigidity and solves for the optimal monetary
policy under dierent levels of integration in the international ﬁnancial markets. The
model suggests that as economies gain access to the international ﬁnancial markets
the optimal monetary policy shifts from pro-cyclical to counter-cyclical. Also, when
economies are denied access to ﬁnancial markets the optimal policy partially oset
exchange rate movements which may be perceived as “fear of ﬂoating”. Results are
robust to a wide range of parameter values and utility speciﬁcations.
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Conventional wisdom recommends that countries follow counter-cyclical monetary policies.
This recommendation dates back to at least Wicksell (1907) and has proven to be robust to
many developments in monetary theory during the past century.1 This paper documents
that while developed economies typically follow this advice, developing countries do not.
Speciﬁcally, the paper ﬁnds that monetary authorities in developed economies tend to
raise their interest rate in times of economic boom and reduce it during slumps, while
in developing countries the opposite is true.2 This ﬁnding raises the question whether
policymakers in developing countries should adopt policies similar to the ones applied in
the developed world, or whether the special conditions under which they operate call for a
digerent policy prescription.
Developing countries have limited access to the international ﬁnancial markets relative
to developed economies. This motivates an analysis that studies how the level of ﬁnancial
integration agects the optimal monetary policy. To that end we employ a standard New-
Keynesian small open economy model with wage rigidity and productivity shocks.3 The
model suggests that under full ﬁnancial integration, i.e. when the economy can borrow and
lend freely in the international ﬁnancial markets, the optimal policy is counter-cyclical,
while under ﬁnancial autarky, i.e. when the economy is denied access to the international
ﬁnancial markets, the optimal policy is pro-cyclical. The paper also demonstrates that the
transition from pro-cyclical to counter-cyclical policies is monotonic in the level of ﬁnancial
integration.4 The main force behind the results is that greater integration stabilizes the
1Counter-cyclical monetary policy was advocated by the “Chicago Plan”; see for example, Mints (1946)
and Friedman (1948). The Keynesian IS-LM model, Hicks (1937), also supports counter-cyclical monetary
policies. Fischer (1977) and Phelps and Taylor (1977) reestablished the optimality of activist monetary
stabilization in a rational expectations framework. Taylor (1993) and much of the New-Keynesian litera-
ture that followed also support counter-cyclical monetary policies; see for example, Woodford (2001) and
Giannoni and Woodford (2002).
2Calvo and Reinhart (2002), Calder´ on et al. (2004), and Kaminsky et al. (2004) also document this
phenomenon.
3In the model the productivity shocks can also be interpreted as terms of trade movements.
4The level of ﬁnancial integration is captured in the model by an adjustment cost to the portfolio of
1exchange rate, which, in turn, tampers its egectiveness as an endogenous shock absorber
and therefore calls for a counter-cyclical policy to step in. Lack of integration, on the
other hand, induces excess volatility of the exchange rate and the attempt to moderate
its movement results in a pro-cyclical policy. The results are robust to a wide range
of parameter values and utility speciﬁcations, to introducing demand shocks, and to the
introduction of a non-tradable sector.
It should be stressed that the research question in this paper is a normative one rather
than positive. That is, we do not interpret the results as necessarily providing an expla-
nation for the observed digerence in monetary conduct between developing and developed
economies; instead, the results provide a normative benchmark for monetary policy under
digerent levels of ﬁnancial integration.
The model incorporates two market imperfections: monopolistic competition in the
labor market and nominal wage rigidity. The monopolistic competition distorts the steady
state equilibrium; hence, in order to motivate monetary policy by cyclical considerations
alone, we allow for a constant labor subsidy that restores the ﬁrst best allocation in steady
state.5 As productivity ﬂuctuates, the role of the monetary policy is therefore to minimize
the distortion introduced by wage rigidity. In this framework the monetary authority
manipulates the nominal interest rate so as to replicate the ﬂexible wages equilibrium.
To gain intuition for the cyclical stance of the optimal policy it is useful to review two
polar cases: full ﬁnancial integration and ﬁnancial autarky.
Under full ﬁnancial integration the optimal monetary policy is counter-cyclical. In this
case the exchange rate is governed by interest rate digerentials. Therefore, in the absence
of a policy response, an improvement in productivity has no egect on the exchange rate. A
stable exchange rate combined with rigid nominal wages implies that real wages are stable
as well. However, if nominal wages were ﬂexible, a positive productivity shock would result
foreign assets. Lower cost implies greater integration.
5This approach is common in the New-Keynesian literature. See for example, Rotemberg and Woodford
(1999), Erceg et al. (2000), and Gal´ ı and Monacelli (2005).
2in higher real wages as it increases labor demand. Therefore, in order to restore the ﬁrst
best allocation, the monetary policy aims to appreciate the domestic currency so as to
increase real wages. This is achieved by raising the nominal interest rate. That is, when
the economy is fully integrated in the world’s ﬁnancial markets, the optimal monetary
policy is counter-cyclical.
Under ﬁnancial autarky the optimal monetary policy is pro-cyclical. In this case house-
holds cannot use the international ﬁnancial markets to smooth consumption; as a result,
a positive productivity shock increases current consumption and hence reduces the domes-
tic real interest rate. In absence of a policy response, the fall in the real interest rate
comes about through an immediate appreciation of the exchange rate (and expectations
for depreciation in subsequent periods). The appreciation increases real wages and hence
endogenously counteracts the expansionary egect of productivity. The magnitude of this
egect depends on the value of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, or the curvature
of the utility function; a lower elasticity, i.e. greater curvature, implies that marginal utili-
ties are more sensitive to movements in consumption and therefore a greater adjustment to
the real interest rate is required in order to restore equilibrium. Hence, when the economy
enjoys a positive productivity shock, a lower elasticity implies a greater appreciation of
the exchange rate and therefore higher real wages. In particular, for elasticity lower than
unity (which is the empirically relevant case) the increase in real wages is greater than the
one implied by the ﬂexible wages equilibrium. Therefore, the optimal policy is to lower
the nominal interest rate so as to depreciate the currency and reduce real wages. That is,
under ﬁnancial autarky the optimal monetary policy is pro-cyclical.
This paper is part of the vast New-Keynesian open-economy literature. Typically, con-
tributions in this literature characterize monetary policies either in terms of an exchange
rate regime or by a policy target.6 Although the cyclical stance of the policy can often be
6See for example, Obstfeld and Rogo (2000), Svensson (2000), Clarida et al (2001), Devereux and
Engel (2003), and Gal´ ı and Monacelli (2005).
3inferred, it is not the focus of attention and is rarely discussed explicitly.
There is also a large body of research that studies monetary policy under ﬁnancial
constraints. However, this literature is typically concerned with the response to sudden
stops rather than the conduct of monetary policy in normal times. For example, Christiano
et al (2004) and Braggion et al (2007) conclude that in face of a sudden stop it is optimal is
to raise interest rate, i.e. to follow a pro-cyclical policy. Their results are driven by binding
collateral constraints, a balance sheet currency mismatch, and a real friction in the tradable
sector. In the absence of collateral constraints these models reproduces the traditional
monetary transmission mechanism and policy recommendations. Similarly, Devereux and
Poon (2004), in a model of currency mismatch and nominal wage rigidity, argue that
under binding collateral constraints the optimal policy is pro-cyclical since a monetary
contraction in this situation helps to relax the collateral constraint. When the constraint
slack the optimal policy is counter-cyclical. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2005) provide a
digerent view. They develop a model where ﬁrms face both domestic and foreign collateral
constraints. In their model the standard credit channel holds during normal times and the
optimal monetary policy is counter-cyclical, but in face of a sudden stop the expansionary
egect of monetary policy vanishes. However, due to precautionary externalities ﬁrms under-
accumulate international liquidity if they expect the central bank to protect the exchange
rate during crises. This insurance incentive calls for counter-cyclical policies with a ﬂexible
exchange rate system.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents evidence regarding
the digerent cyclical stance of monetary policies in developing versus developed economies.
Section 3 presents the model. For simplicity, this section focuses only on two polar cases
of ﬁnancial integration. Section 4 provides closed form solutions to the optimal monetary
policies. Section 5 extends the model to include intermediate levels of integration and
conducts sensitivity analysis. As additional robustness checks, section 6 introduces demand
shocks and a non-tradable sector to the model. Section 7 concludes.
42 Cyclicality of Monetary Policy: Stylized Facts
This section documents that developed economies tend to follow counter-cyclical monetary
policies while developing countries do the opposite.
The empirical analysis is mainly inﬂuenced by Kaminsky Reinhart and V´ egh (2004),
KRV hereafter. KRV have documented that OECD countries tend to follow counter-cyclical
monetary policies while non-OECD countries typically follow pro-cyclical policies. Their
dataset consists of a panel of 104 countries in annual frequency. Although informative, we
wish to reﬁne their results along two dimensions. First, monetary policy is often evaluated
on a monthly basis and therefore it is interesting to reestablish their ﬁndings using data
of higher frequency. Second, and more importantly for our purpose, KRV’s analysis does
not discriminate across exchange rate regimes, while the theoretical model in this paper
suggests that the pro-cyclicality of monetary policy hinges on movements in the exchange
rate. This result directs our empirical investigation to focus on countries that let their
currency ﬂuctuate. These considerations guide our criteria for sample selection.
2.1 Sample Selection
We use quarterly data for the period 1974-2004 and restrict the sample to include countries
with ﬂoating or dirty-ﬂoating exchange rate regimes with at least 20 consecutive observa-
tions. In addition, we remove observations during periods of annual CPI inﬂation greater
than 100 percent.7
Exchange rate regimes are determined using the classiﬁcation of Levy-Yeyati and Sturzeneg-
ger (2005). Based on actual ﬂuctuations in the exchange rate, its rate of change, and in-
ternational reserves, their work provides a classiﬁcation of de-facto exchange rate regimes
for IMF-reporting countries. We use data from the International Financial Statistics (IFS)
database, and use the IMF’s classiﬁcation of advanced economies and developing countries
7This criterion is not very restrictive. It only removes the high inﬂation periods in Peru and Israel and
eliminates Belarus from the sample. It does not, however, change any of the conclusions.
5as reported in the World Economic Outlook.8 The data appendix provides more details on
country-speciﬁc sample periods and selection criteria of exchange rate regimes.
Our selection criteria leave us with 15 developed economies and 15 developing countries
with varying sample periods. The developed economies are: Australia, Canada, France,
Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Singapore, Spain, Switzerland, United King-
dom, United States, and the Euro Area. The developing countries are: Chile, Colombia,
Croatia, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Georgia, Indonesia, Kyrgyz Republic, Mexico, Peru,
Philippines, Poland, South Africa, Thailand, and Turkey.
2.2 Methodology and Results
We use the short-term nominal interest rate as the policy instrument. Speciﬁcally, we use
either the central bank’s discount rate or the interbank short-term market rate, depending
on data availability. To determine the cyclical stance of the monetary policy we measure
the correlation between cyclical movements in the interest rate and output; in addition,
we estimate interest rate rules and evaluate the sign of the coecients on output. Positive
correlations and positive regression coecients indicate counter-cyclical monetary policies,
while negative values indicate pro-cyclical policies. In what follows we report averages for
each country group; country-speciﬁc values are presented in the data appendix.
2.2.1 Interest-Output Correlation
We calculate the correlation coecient in each country between the cyclical components of
the interest rate and the natural logarithm of real GDP; these are measured by removing
Hodrick-Prescott (HP hereafter) trend from the series.
Panel A in Table 1 summarizes the results. On average the correlations are positive in
developed economies (0.26) and negative in developing countries (-0.18). The distribution
of the correlations within each group of countries provides further support to the digerence
8”Advanced economies” is the World Economic Outlook’s terminology for developed economies.
6in monetary policies. In developed economies 13 of the 15 correlations are positive, and 7
of them are signiﬁcantly digerent from zero while none of the negative correlations is sig-
niﬁcant.9 In developing countries 10 of the 15 correlations are negative, with 5 signiﬁcantly
digerent from zero and none of the positive correlations is signiﬁcant. Figure 1 illustrates
these ﬁndings graphically.
2.2.2 Interest Rate Rules
We estimate an interest rate rule for each country. Our speciﬁcation takes the form:
e Uw = e w + |e \w + {e w + %w (1)
where e Uw, e w, e \w, and {e w are the cyclical components (measured using HP ﬁlter) of the
nominal interest rate, CPI inﬂation in the past 4 quarters, the logarithm of real GDP,
and the rate of change in the nominal exchange rate,10 respectively. For  = 0, this
speciﬁcation is similar to the one in Taylor (1993).
Some authors argue that in open economies the monetary authority should react to
exchange rate movements in addition to inﬂation and output,11 for that reason we include
it in (1). It should be noted, however, that others argue against the inclusion of the
exchange rate in the policy rule. Taylor (2001), for example, argues that policy rules like
(1) do not perform much better, and sometimes even worse, than rules that impose  = 0.
The reason is that ﬂuctuations in the exchange rate agect both inﬂation and output; as a
result, the interest rate reacts indirectly to exchange rate ﬂuctuations even when it is not
included explicitly in the policy rule. A direct reaction to the exchange rate brings only
minor improvement, if any.12
We ﬁrst impose  = 0 and estimate (1) by OLS for each country separately. We also
use a GLS panel regression where we restrict output coecients to be equal for all countries
9Unless otherwise stated, we use a 5 percent signiﬁcance level.
10We use eective exchange rates whenever available, otherwise we use the exchange rate against the US
dollar. See the data appendix for details.
11See Ball (1999) and Benigno and Benigno (2001).
12Clarida et al. (2001) and Leitemo and S¨ oderstr¨ om (2005) make similar arguments.
7within each group.13 Panel B in Table 1 summarizes the results. Similarly to the indication
of the correlation coecients, on average | is positive for developed economies (0.22) and
negative for developing countries (-0.33). In developed economies 11 of the 15 coecients
are positive, and 7 of them are signiﬁcantly digerent from zero. In developing countries 12
of the 15 coecients are negative, and 5 of them are signiﬁcant. The panel regression also
produces a positive coecient for developed economies (0.18) and a negative coecient for
developing countries (-0.11), with both signiﬁcantly digerent from zero.
Next, we add the exchange rate to the regression. We estimate (1) by TSLS and use the
lagged interest rate, e Uw31, and the lagged change in the exchange rate, {e w31, as instru-
ments for {e w. Panel C summarizes the results. As before, output coecients are positive,
on average, in developed economies (0.13) and negative in developing countries (-0.14);
however, signiﬁcance levels deteriorate in these estimations. The panel regression seems to
result in more accurate estimates as it pools more observations for the output coecients.
For developed economies | is positive (0.27) and signiﬁcant, and for developing countries
the coecient is negative (-0.17) and signiﬁcant at 8 percent signiﬁcance level.
In sum, our analysis supports KRV’s ﬁndings. That is, we also ﬁnd that developed
economies tend to follow counter-cyclical monetary policies while developing countries typ-
ically follow pro-cyclical policies.
3 The Model: Two Polar Cases of Financial Integra-
tion
This section lays down the model. Here we start by analyzing two polar cases of ﬁnancial
integration, complete markets and ﬁnancial autarky, since these can be easily solved with
closed form solutions (after taking log-linear approximation). Later, in Section 5, we extend
13The estimation allows for country-speciﬁc inﬂation coecients and variances. We do not use ﬁxed
eects since all intercepts are zero by construction. Also, endogeneity problems are probably minor when
 = 0 since typically the transmission mechanism from monetary policy to output and prices works with
lags.
8the model to include intermediate levels of integration.
3.1 The environment
Consider a small open economy that is perfectly integrated in the world’s goods markets.
Agents in the economy produce and consume one tradable good. Production technology is
subject to productivity shocks which, for now, is the only source of aggregate uncertainty
in the model.14 We consider two structures of international ﬁnancial markets: complete
markets and ﬁnancial autarky.
The economy consists of households, employment agencies, ﬁrms, insurance companies,
and a government. Households consume the single good and are endowed with digerentiated
labor skills. They act as monopolists in the labor market as each household sets the nominal
wage of its own labor skill. Nominal wages are sticky ` a la Calvo (1983); that is, households
can adjust their nominal wage only when they receive a random idiosyncratic signal that
allows them to do so. The insurance companies provide households with insurance against
these shocks. The employment agencies rent labor services from the households. They
aggregate digerentiated skills into labor inputs which, in turn, are supplied to the ﬁrms.
The ﬁrms use labor inputs to produce the good. The government sets the monetary policy
by controlling the nominal interest rate. Following Woodford (2003), money, or more
precisely - cash, serves only as a unit of account. We ﬁnd this approach appropriate to
the question of this paper since it allows abstracting from considerations that motivate the
Friedman rule as optimal; as a result, we are able to set the steady state nominal interest
rate at any arbitrary level and focus the analysis only on the cyclical properties of the
monetary policy.15
14It should be noted that the model economy is equivalent to one where ﬁrms produce an exportable
good and households consume an importable good. In that case productivity can be interpreted as terms
of trade (or the product of terms of trade and productivity).
15An earlier version of this paper used money in the utility function. When solving for the optimal
monetary policy it is common to assume that the utility from liquidity services is arbitrarily small. See,
for example, Obstfeld and Rogo (1995, 1998, 2000), Devereux and Engel (2003), and Corsetti and Pesenti
(2005). This assumption allows abstracting from considerations that motivate the Friedman rule. Here we
93.1.1 Prices
Let Sw denote the domestic currency price of the good, and Vw the nominal exchange rate
(the price of one unit of foreign currency in terms of the domestic currency). Normalizing
the foreign currency price of the good to 1 and assuming that the law of one price holds,
we get:
Sw = Vw
From now on we will use the exchange rate in place of the price level.
3.1.2 Shocks
Productivity, Dw, is the only source of aggregate uncertainty. We assume that it follows a
stationary DU(1) process in logs:









In addition, there are household-speciﬁc shocks. Households are indexed by k, k 5
[0>1], and they receive binary idiosyncratic shocks, Lw (k), that either get the value 0 or 1.
Whenever Lw (k) = 1 household k is allowed to freely adjust its nominal wage for period w,
otherwise Lw (k) = 0 and the nominal wage is set to a predetermined level. The shocks are
llg over time and across households, and they are independent of the aggregate shock Dw.
Speciﬁcally we assume that the idiosyncratic shocks follow a Bernoulli distribution:
Lw (k)  E (1  z)
Where 1  z is the probability of a household to receive a signal that allows it to change
its wage.
adopt a cashless economy model as in Woodford (2003). The two modeling strategies result in an identical
system of equations except, of course, for money demand. The cashless economy, however, avoids the need
to resort to conﬂicting assumptions between motives for holding money and policy considerations.
10We denote by vw the realization of aggregate events in date w. vw denotes the history of
aggregate events from date zero to date w, that is vw = (v0>v1>===>vw). We assume that the
economy starts from steady state and therefore there is no uncertainty with respect to v0.
3.1.3 Financial Assets
A full set of contingent ﬁnancial assets, denoted by EW
w (vw>vw+1), is available. Each unit of
EW
w (vw>vw+1) pays one unit of the foreign currency if (vw>vw+1) realizes, and is traded in date
w after history vw. Each unit of EW
w (vw>vw+1) costs TW
w (vw>vw+1) units of the foreign currency.
The stochastic discount factor in terms of domestic currency, Tw (vw>vw+1), is determined by
















The risk-free foreign interest factor, UW


























Under full ﬁnancial integration asset prices, TW
w (vw>vw+1), are taken exogenously; we assume,























We assume that in the international ﬁnancial markets UW





11where  is the subjective discount factor of the households. When the economy is in
ﬁnancial autarky foreign assets are restricted to zero and UW
w becomes endogenous and
hence no longer equal 
31.16




In every period households and insurance companies meet to sign state-contingent insurance
contracts against next period’s idiosyncratic shocks. These contracts provide insurance
against the inability to control nominal wages in the next period. Under each contract it
is agreed that if Lw+1 (vw>vw+1>k) = 1 then household k pays the insurance company one
unit of the domestic currency, while if Lw+1 (vw>vw+1>k) = 0 the household receives t units.
Let ew (vw>vw+1>k) denote the quantity of such contracts. Notice that any possible future


































which reﬂects actuarially fair pricing in the insurance market.
16In that case T
w (vw>vw+1) is endogenous. Its equilibrium level brings the holdings of E to zero.
Note that although households are faced with idiosyncratic shocks, the existence of insurance companies
(discussed in section 3.2.1) guarantees that all households choose the same portfolio of E.
123.2.2 Employment Agencies
Employment agencies are price takers. They construct labor inputs, Ow, by aggregating










Ow is then supplied to the ﬁrms. Competition among employment agencies generates the







where zw (k) is the nominal wage of labor skill type k, and Zw is the aggregate wage index










There is a large number of identical competitive ﬁrms. The ﬁrms produce a tradable good
with labor as the only factor of production. Output, \w, is given by:
\w = DwO

w 0 ?  ? 1 (6)








The government issues nominal domestic risk-free bonds, Ew, and provides lump sum trans-
fers, Ww, to the households. It also subsidizes labor at rate z in order to ogset the distor-
tionary egect of the monopolistic competition in the labor market. The government budget
13constraint is given by:




The monetary policy is carried out by controlling Uw.
3.2.5 Households
Households consume the good and trade in ﬁnancial assets. They also set their wage,
zw (k), whenever they receive a signal that allows them to do so, i.e. when Lw (k) = 1. If the
household does not receive a signal, then the nominal wage is automatically updated by the
steady state inﬂation rate, vv, as in Erceg et al. (2000), that is: zw (k) = (1 + vv)zw31 (k).
Given the nominal wage, households supply any level of labor so as to satisfy labor demand
(4).





























w>Lw+1 (k) = 0
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gvw+1 = (1 + z)
zw (k)
Vw













































w>Lw+1 (k) = 0
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gvw+1 = (1 + z)
zw (k)
Vw











Uw31Ew31 (k) + w + Ww + tew31 (vw>k)
Vw
 fw (k)
where X (·) is the periodical utility function. It is twice continuously digerentiable with
Xf A 0, Xo ? 0, Xff>Xoo ? 0, and XffXoo  X2
fo A 0. We also assume that both consumption
and leisure are not inferior goods, which implies that XfXooXoXfo  0 and XfXofXoXff  0.
w is proﬁts, and zw (k) is the wage whenever Lw (k) = 0. Notice that the digerence between
Y1 and Y0 is that under former the wage rate is a choice variable, while under the latter it
is taken as given and it is part of the state variables. In addition, the budget constraints
diger in the payment to/from the insurance companies.
Optimality Conditions Optimal choice of wage insurance contracts together with their









w>Lw (k) = 0
¢
That is, the marginal utility of consumption is perfectly smoothed across idiosyncratic
states.
15Access to the world ﬁnancial markets allows for smoothing the marginal utilities over












w(vw>vw+1) Xfw+1 (vw+1>k) under ﬁnancial autarky
(8)
Note that under ﬁnancial autarky TW
w (vw>vw+1) is endogenous, as assets are traded domes-
tically with zero net supply.









We assume symmetry across households. Speciﬁcally, endowment of assets in period zero
is such that initially all households have the same marginal utility of consumption. This
assumption coupled with the optimality conditions above implies that marginal utilities












w>e k>b k (10)
Therefore, from this point on we will drop the index k from the marginal utility of con-
sumption.
Optimal wage setting gives:



































where Hw>0 denotes the mathematical expectation conditional on history vw, Lw (k) = 1, and
Lw+v (k) = 0 for all v A 0.
Generally (11) does not characterize a solution for zw (k) in terms of aggregate quantities
and market prices. This is because the marginal utility of labor, Xo, may diger across
households as it depends on household speciﬁc consumption and labor levels. In order to
16overcome this problem previous studies have resorted to additively separable utility in f
and o. In that case, equation (4) suggests that Xo only depends on zw (k), Zw and Ow; hence,
given prices and aggregate quantities (11) characterizes a solution for zw (k). Furthermore,
this argument also suggests that in each period all households that are allowed to adjust
their wage choose the same level. Therefore, in order to solve for aggregate quantities it is
sucient, in the additively separable case, to keep track of new and average wages only.
This paper extends the analysis to non-separable utility functions. The main argument
is that although consumption may now diger across households, their marginal utility,
Xf, does not. As a result, households with the same wage also have the same level of
consumption. Therefore, the result of the additively separable case remains; in each period,
all households that are allowed to adjust their wage choose the same level. The digerence
is that now one should keep track of new and average consumptions in addition to wages.17




















































Notice that households b k and e k will continue having the same wage, labor egort, and
consumption as long as both cannot readjust their wage. This result leads us to characterize
households by cohorts rather than their index k.
Notation 1 Let zw
w and fw
w denote date w wage and consumption, respectively, of households
such that Lw (k) = 1.
To gain intuition for the optimal wage setting condition, equation (11), notice that











17See Appendix A in Yakhin (2007) for a derivation.
17which simply suggests that households charge a constant markup, 
31, over labor supply.
The supply function is given by the marginal rate of substitution between consumption
and labor, 
Xo
Xf, divided by 1 + z. The subsidy simply shifts the position of the supply
curve. Under sticky wages, i.e. z A 0, the markup is over a weighted average of future
labor supplies for histories in which the household would not be able to readjust its wage.
The weights are given by w+v.
3.3 Aggregate Consumption
As mentioned, in order to solve for the macroeconomic equilibrium we need to keep track
of consumption of households with Lw (k) = 1 and the average consumption level in the









where C = {k : Lw (k) = 1}
That is, FR
w is date w average consumption of households that cannot adjust their wage.
Using this notation aggregate consumption in the economy, Fw, is given by:





3.4 The Resource Constraint
Combine the households’ budget constraint with the government budget constraint, ﬁrms’


















+ \w  Fw (13)
Under ﬁnancial autarky we will impose EW
w = 0 for all w.
183.5 Model’s Solution
We solve the model by taking a ﬁrst order approximation around the deterministic steady
state. This results in a simple linear system that allows us to derive closed form solutions.
Before approximating the system we must impose stationarity on the nominal variables;
















3.5.1 System of Equations
Under full ﬁnancial integration the steady state level of foreign assets is exogenous; there-
fore, for consistency with the case of ﬁnancial autarky, we assume EW
vv = 0. Log-linearization
of equations (2), and (5) through (13), results in:
e Dw  = D e Dw31 + %D>w (14)
e lw  = (1  z) e $
w
w + ze lw31 (15)
e \w  = e Dw + e Ow (16)
e lw  e w  = e Dw  (1  ) e Ow (17)
f e Fw + foe Ow  =
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w = 0 under ﬁnancial autarky. (23)



















A 0 by concavity
This system gives us 10 equations in 11 variables. Under full ﬁnancial integration the
variables are: e Ow, e \w, e lw, e $
w
w, e w, e Fw, e fw
w, e FR
w , EW
w, e Uw, and e Dw, while under ﬁnancial autarky
e UW
w replaces EW
w. The model is closed by letting the monetary authority choose e Uw.
4 Optimal Monetary Policy
This section solves for the ﬁrst best allocation and then ﬁnds a monetary policy that
recovers it as an equilibrium outcome. Clearly, if such a policy exists, it is optimal. We
conduct this exercise for both structures of ﬁnancial markets and then analyze the cyclical
properties of the optimal policies. It should be noted that for simplicity we discuss only
non-sunspot equilibria. Appendix 1 shows how the policy rules presented in this section
can be modiﬁed in order to establish uniqueness without agecting any of the results.
4.1 Full Financial Integration

































20For simplicity, this formulation already imposes a symmetric allocation across households
and therefore we only need to ﬁnd the aggregate quantities.18 The ﬁrst best allocation is
characterized by:

























w  Fw (26)
Notice that by (7), (8), (11), and (13), the economy with staggered wages has the same




That is, the optimal labor subsidy exactly ogsets the distortion of the monopolistic com-
petition in the labor market. As in Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), the ﬁscal policy in
the model is focused on restoring the optimal level of economic activity and is independent
of the monetary policy. The role of the monetary policy is therefore to restore optimal
ﬂuctuations.
4.1.1 Optimal Monetary Policy
The ﬁrst best allocation clearly digers from the staggered wages equilibrium in its labor
market condition.19 Recall, however, that in characterizing the equilibrium we had one
degree of freedom left as we derived 10 equations in 11 unknowns. We can therefore impose
eciency in the labor market as suggested by (25), and then solve for the implied monetary
policy.
After complementing the equilibrium conditions with the log linearized version of (25),
18Symmetry follows by concavity of preferences and equal welfare weights across households.
19Under ﬂexible wages, i.e. z = 0, the economy achieves the ﬁrst best regardless of the monetary policy
(assuming z = 1
1).
21the implied interest rate rule is given by:20
e Uw  =
K
1   + K
(1  D) e Dw (27)
and in terms of output:
e Uw  =
K
1 + K
(1  D) e \w (28)
By concavity of X (·) we have K A 0, which suggests that the optimal monetary policy is
counter-cyclical since the interest rate increases with output.
Interestingly, we ﬁnd that under the optimal policy nominal wages always take their
steady state value, that is:
e lw  = 0
Therefore, the optimal monetary policy targets wage inﬂation. The reason is that this
policy exactly ogsets the distortion that sticky wages introduce. The monetary authority
manipulates the interest rate in a way that households who can adjust their wage choose
to change it by exactly the steady state inﬂation rate. As a result, the relative price of any
two labor skills is constant at unity and all households enjoy the optimal wage level that
would have prevailed if wages were ﬂexible.
4.2 Financial Autarky
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20As discussed in chapter 4 of Woodford (2003), an interest rate rule that depends only on exogenous
shocks may lead to sunspots equilibria and therefore may result in undesirable outcomes. Woodford (2003)
also shows that uniqueness may be restored by modifying the interest rate rule to react to endogenous
variables. Appendix 1 ﬁnds optimal rules that react to both the productivity and the exchange rate such
that equilibrium is unique and all results discussed in the text remain.















4.2.1 Optimal Monetary Policy
As in the case of full integration, the ﬁrst best allocation digers from the staggered wages
economy only in its labor market condition. Taking the same approach as before, we com-
plement the equilibrium conditions of the staggered wages economy by imposing eciency
in the labor market and then ﬁnd the implied interest rate rule.
The solution for the optimal rule in this case is given by:21
e Uw  =
fo  foof + o + of
1  (1 + f  of) + o  fo
(1  D) e Dw (31)
and in terms of output:
e Uw  =
fo  foof + o + of
1 + o  fo
(1  D) e \w (32)
Also, as in the case of full integration we have:
e lw = 0
That is, the monetary authority completely ogsets the distortion that sticky wages intro-
duce.
We now turn to analyzing the cyclical properties of the optimal monetary policy. The
assumption of normality in consumption and leisure implies that ofo A 0, which suggests
21The comment in the previous footnote applies to equation (31) as well.
23that the denominator in (32) is positive; therefore, the cyclical stance is determined by the
sign of the numerator. Speciﬁcally the optimal monetary policy is pro-cyclical if:
fo  foof ? (o + of)




The left hand side is the determinant of the Hessian matrix of the utility function and it is
positive by assumption of concavity. The right hand side can be either positive or negative.
This suggests that under ﬁnancial autarky the optimal policy is pro-cyclical provided that
the utility function exhibits sucient curvature as measured by the determinant of its
Hessian matrix.
In order to asses the empirical plausibility of this condition we continue by experiment-
ing with digerent types of utility functions and evaluate the parameter requirements for
generating pro-cyclical policies. In what follows we experiment with an additively separa-
ble utility in consumption and labor, a Cobb-Douglas utility function, and preferences that
exhibit no wealth egect in labor supply as in Greenwood Hercowitz and Hugman (1988),
GHH preferences hereafter.
Additively Separable Utility Function For additively separable utility function
we have fo = of = 0. In this case The optimal monetary policy is given by:
e Uw  = (1 + f)
o
1 + o
(1  D) e \w
which suggests that the policy is pro-cyclical if f ? 1. Recall that f =
Xffvv
Xfvv Fvv ? 0 and
its absolute value is the relative risk aversion coecient, or the inverse of the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution (IES). Notably, relative risk aversion coecients greater than
unity, or IES below unity, lie well within empirical estimates.22
22Van Winccop (1999) argues that a relative risk aversion of 3 represents an average of estimates in the
literature, while Reinhart and V´ egh (1995) argue that estimates for the IES are typically well below unity.









where 0 ?  ? 1 and  A 0.  is a curvature parameter and in this case the IES is given
by 1
13(13). Under these preferences the optimal policy becomes:
e Uw  = (1  )(1  D) e \w








where #> A 0 and y A 1. Again,  is a curvature parameter and in this case the IES is
given by 1
. Under these preferences the optimal policy becomes:
e Uw  =
y31
y  
y2 (1  D) e \w
This suggests that the policy is pro-cyclical if  A y31
y . Therefore, an IES below unity is
sucient for pro-cyclicality.
To conclude, under ﬁnancial autarky the optimal monetary policy is pro-cyclical pro-
vided that preferences are ”suciently concave”. By experimenting with digerent types of
utility functions it seems that preferences with IES below unity satisfy this requirement.
4.3 Intuition
We have just shown the main result of the paper: if the economy is fully integrated in
the world’s ﬁnancial markets then the optimal monetary policy is counter-cyclical, while
under ﬁnancial autarky the optimal policy is pro-cyclical provided that utility is suciently
concave.
25The key to understanding this result is the behavior of the exchange rate and its egect
on real wages. In order to gain some intuition we analyze the reaction of the economy to an
increase in e Dw. We will ﬁrst hold the interest rate constant and then ask in what direction
it should move in order to restore the ﬂexible wages equilibrium.
For simplicity we make two assumptions. First, assume that z is arbitrarily close to
1, hence the nominal wage index remains unchanged throughout the analysis. Second, we
assume that labor supply is ﬁxed throughout the analysis, which is equivalent to assuming
GHH preferences. Of course, neither of the assumptions are needed for the results to hold.
Full Financial Integration As e Dw increases, labor demand shifts outward, while
labor supply remains unchanged. This is illustrated in Figure 2.
Also, notice that since households perfectly smooth their marginal utility of consump-
tion the Euler equation (19) coincides in this case with the interest parity condition:
e Uw = Hw (e w+1)  e w
If the interest rate is unchanged then the exchange rate is constant, which in turn leaves
real wages unchanged. As a result the economy moves from point D to point EFP in the
ﬁgure. Recall that the ﬁrst best allocation is achieved by the ﬂexible wages equilibrium,
which is represented by point F. It is now clear that the optimal policy in this case aims
to appreciate the domestic currency so as to increase the real wage and move the economy
to point F. This is achieved by an increase in the interest rate and therefore the optimal
monetary policy is counter-cyclical.
Financial Autarky As before, an improvement in productivity shifts labor demand
outward, while labor supply remains unchanged. However, under ﬁnancial autarky the
economic expansion reduces the current marginal utility of consumption as households can
no longer use the international ﬁnancial markets to smooth it.
26The economic expansion is expected to die out over time; therefore, the fall in marginal
utilities reduces the real interest rate. This can be seen from the Euler equation (19).
Since we hold the nominal interest rate ﬁxed, a fall in the real interest rate can come
about only through an appreciation of the exchange rate, this in turn raises real wages and
endogenously counteracts the initial expansion.
We know that the optimal policy attempts to manipulate the exchange rate in a way that
brings the economy to point F. Therefore, in order to evaluate the direction in which the
monetary authority should change the interest rate, we need to determine the magnitude
of the increase in real wages. If the appreciation of the exchange rate leads the economy to
a point below F (a point like EID>1 in Figure 2), then the optimal response is to increase
the interest rate; while if the economy reaches a point above F (such as EID>2) then the
optimal response is to reduce the interest rate.
We can now see how the curvature of the utility function plays a role in determining the
cyclical stance of the optimal policy. From (19) it is clear that the greater the movement
in marginal utilities the greater is the movement in the real interest rate that is required
in order to restore equilibrium. Therefore, a greater curvature implies a greater movement
in the exchange rate, which in turn makes it more likely to bring the economy to a point
like EID>2 where the optimal policy is pro-cyclical, that is to reduce the interest rate in
response to a positive productivity shock.
Notice that this policy suggests that developing economies should pursue policies that
actively stabilize their exchange rate. Calvo and Reinhart (2002) label this type of policies
as ”fear of ﬂoating”, and while they criticize them our model supports these policies as
optimal.
5 Digerent Levels of Financial Integration
The analysis so far has focused on two polar cases: full ﬁnancial integration and ﬁnancial
autarky. This section allows for intermediate levels of integration and demonstrates that
27the optimal monetary policy shifts monotonically from pro-cyclical to counter-cyclical as
the economy becomes more integrated in the international ﬁnancial markets.
5.1 Model’s Alteration
Now assume that domestic residents can only trade risk-free bonds in the international
markets. Let EW
w denote the number of foreign bonds bought in date w. Each unit of EW
w
pays UW
w units of the foreign currency in w + 1 with certainty.
Financial integration is modeled by introducing a convex adjustment cost to the portfo-
lio of foreign assets, n(EW
w), where the function n(·) satisﬁes n(EW
vv) = 0, n0 (EW
vv) = 0, and
n00 (·)  0. This cost represents various barriers that prevent domestic residents from trad-
ing freely in the international ﬁnancial markets; such barriers may include taxes, transaction
costs, costs that arise from exchanging currencies, country risk, and any form of capital
controls. Clearly, lower cost implies greater ﬁnancial integration.
Note that since the model is linearized, and due to our assumptions regarding the cost
function, only its second derivative evaluated at steady state, n00 (EW
vv), matters for the
dynamics of the model. Therefore, all functions that satisfy the assumptions above are












2   0
Varying  allows us to study the egect of ﬁnancial integration. When  = 0 the economy
can borrow and lend freely at the world’s interest rate and therefore this case represents a
developed economy.23 In addition, when  is negligibly small the dynamics of the model
are very similar to those of the complete markets case analyzed earlier.24 As  increases the
23It is well known that linearized small open economy models with risk-free bonds and no frictions in
the ﬁnancial markets induce unit-root dynamics. The introduction of a portfolio adjustment cost restores
stationarity. Therefore, for the case of full integration we will use an arbitrarily small  rather than
zero. This approach is standard in the literature. See, for example, Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2003) and
Neumeyer and Perri (2005).
24This result is in-line with other papers in the literature. Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2003) show that
28country faces greater barriers to adjusting its foreign portfolio, and as  $ 4 the country
is in ﬁnancial autarky. We can therefore move continuously from full ﬁnancial integration
to ﬁnancial autarky by varying .
This modiﬁcation to the model only alters the Euler equation for foreign assets and the
resource constraint of the economy. The Euler equation is now given by:




























w31 + \w  Fw (35)
Equations (34) and (35) replace (8) and (13), respectively. As before, the optimal monetary
policy is found by imposing eciency in the labor market.
The log-linearized system of equations is solved numerically using the method of Sims
(2002). The model is then simulated in order to study the cyclical properties of the mone-
tary policy for digerent values of . The choice of parameter values and utility function is
described below.
5.2 Calibration
In all simulations we use GHH preferences as speciﬁed by (33). These preferences are
commonly used in small open economy models, see for example Mendoza (1991), Correia
et al (1995), and Neumeyer and Perri (2005). It should be noted that similar results are
obtained from using a Cobb-Douglas utility function and additively separable preferences.
Parameter values are mainly adopted from other studies in the literature. Table 2
reports the baseline parameterization.
small open economy models with risk-free bonds behave almost identically to their complete markets
counterparts. Baxter and Crucini (1995) and Heathcote and Perri (2002) ﬁnd similar results in two-country
models.
29A period in the model corresponds to one quarter. The discount factor, , is set to
0=99, which suggests a world real interest rate of 4 percent. Labor income share, , is set
to 0=7.
We set the curvature parameter, , to 2. Mendoza (1991) experiments with two values
1 and 2, Correia et al (1995) choose 2, Neumeyer and Perri (2005) follow the recommen-
dation of Reinhart and V´ egh (1995) regarding the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
in developing countries and set  to 5. However, since the analysis of the case of ﬁnancial
autarky suggests that the cyclical pattern of the monetary policy may crucially depend on
this parameter, we will experiment with other values as well.
The elasticity of labor supply is given by 1
y31. We follow Neumeyer and Perri (2005)
and set y to 1=6 (an elasticity of 1=67); Mendoza (1991) choose y = 1=455 (an elasticity of
2=2) and Correia et al (1995) choose a value of 1=7 (an elasticity of 1=43).
The parameter # agects steady state values of macroeconomic aggregates, however it
does not appear in any of the log-linearized equations and therefore it is irrelevant for the
calibration.
The elasticity of substitution between digerentiated labor skills, , takes a value of 6.
This implies a markup of 20 percent ( 
31) in the labor market. For comparison, Erceg et
al (2000) take  = 4 (a markup of 33 percent), Chari et al (2002) use  = 7=67 (a markup
of 15 percent), Huang and Liu (2002) use values of  = 2>4>6 (markups of 100, 33, and 20
percent, respectively).
The probability to receive a wage adjustment signal, 1  z, is set to 0=25. This cor-
responds to an average wage duration of 4 quarters ( 1
13z). This value is consistent with
Erceg et al (2000), Chari et al (2002), and Huang and Liu (2002).
The autocorrelation coecient of productivity, D, is set to 0=9. This is somewhat
lower relative to other values in the literature; however, as mentioned earlier, productivity
shocks in the model can be equivalently interpreted as terms of trade movements, and in
30our sample the latter display lower autocorrelations.25
The standard deviation of the innovation to productivity, D, is set arbitrarily to 0=01.
Naturally, this parameter agects the volatility of economic aggregates; however, since the
model is linearized and is driven by only one shock, the volatility of the error term has no
egect on correlations, and speciﬁcally it has no egect on the correlation between output
and the nominal interest rate, which is our object of interest.
Finally, the parameter  allows us to move from the case of full integration to ﬁnancial
autarky. We will therefore experiment with a wide range of values.
5.3 Results
We use the baseline parameterization to simulate the model under digerent levels of .
Figure 3 presents the correlation between the nominal interest rate, e Uw, and output, e \w,
as a function of  using the baseline parameterization. Each data point in the ﬁgure
is the average correlation over 10>000 simulations each 100 periods long. The solid line
corresponds to this version of the model. As expected, the correlation falls as  increases,
it is positive for small ’s and becomes negative for large ’s. That is, as the economy
becomes less integrated in the world’s ﬁnancial markets the optimal monetary policy shifts
from counter-cyclical to pro-cyclical.
It should be noted that results are robust to the speciﬁcation of the utility function,
speciﬁcally the use of a Cobb-Douglas utility function or additively separable preferences
generate similar result.
25With the exception of Singapore, which displays an extremely low autocorrelation, the coecient
for developed economies varies from 0.84 to 0.99 with an average of 0.91. For developing counties the
autocorrelation varies from 0.51 to 0.94, with an average of 0.70. Due to limitation of data availability
these statistics are based on 12 developed economies and 6 developing countries. See the data appendix
for details.
315.4 Sensitivity Analysis
The choice of parameter values is largely based on studies that focused on developed
economies. We therefore wish to reevaluate the implications for the cyclical pattern of
monetary policy using other values as well.
The closed form solution for the case of ﬁnancial autarky, equation (32), indicates that
the results crucially depend on the curvature of the utility function. Speciﬁcally, under
GHH preferences if  ? y31
y then the optimal policy is counter-cyclical even when the
economy is cutog from the international ﬁnancial markets. Under our parameterization
the cutog value is y31
y = 0=375; however, since y A 1 the cutog value cannot exceed unity.
In order to evaluate the robustness of the results we experiment with digerent values
of . Panel A of Figure 4 depicts the correlation between output, e \w, and the nominal
interest rate, e Uw, for digerent values of . The ﬁgure reveals, as one may expect, that when
 A y31
y the correlation falls monotonically as the economy becomes less integrated in the
international ﬁnancial markets. On the other hand, when  ? y31
y the model displays high
correlations for any level of ﬁnancial integration.
The rest of the panels in Figure 4 study the egect of other parameters on the cyclical
stance of the monetary policy. Practically none of the parameters seems to have any
important quantitative egect on the results.
6 Robustness
This section conducts two robustness experiments. The ﬁrst introduces demand shocks to
the model and the second adds a non-tradable sector. We show that the results are largely
unagected by these modiﬁcations.
326.1 Demand Shocks
Typically, counter-cyclical monetary policies are recommended under the premise that the
business cycle is driven by demand shocks. In contrast, the business cycle in the model
is driven by supply shocks. We therefore wish to reevaluate the results after introducing
demand shocks to the model.
6.1.1 Model’s Alteration
We alter the model only by adding a stochastic preference parameter. The periodical utility



















, FRY (%>w>%D>w) = 0
That is, w follows a stationary DU(1) process (in logs) and it is uncorrelated with the
supply shock. Other than that, the model is identical to the one presented earlier.
The preference shock agects the intertemporal decisions of the households. A rise in w
increases current marginal utility of consumption relative to its expected value in future
periods, this in turn stimulates current demand and causes a consumption boom.
The introduction of preference shocks only agects the Euler equation for foreign assets
(34), the Euler equation for domestic bonds (9), and the optimal wage setting (11). The
only digerence is that all marginal utilities, Xfw and Xow, are now multiplied by w. As
before, the optimal monetary policy seeks to restore eciency in the labor market.
6.1.2 Parameter Values
It is hard to evaluate the relative importance of preferences shocks relative to supply shocks,
and unfortunately the literature provides little guidance in this respect. Parkin (1988) con-
33cludes that ﬂuctuations in preference shocks are tiny, while Hall (1997) ﬁnds that they play
a dominant role in driving the business cycle and speciﬁcally are more volatile than pro-
ductivity shocks. Baxter and King (1991) ﬁnd that both shocks display similar persistence
while the variance of preference shocks is about 36 percent greater than that of productivity
shocks. Stockman and Tesar (1995) report diculties in estimating a stochastic process for
preference shocks. Depending on the procedure they employ, their estimates of the variance
of the preference parameter varies from 0=01 to 2=5 times the variance of productivity.
In absence of clear guidance from the literature we experiment with a wide range of
relative volatilities. We regard the case where demand shocks follow the same time series
process as productivity as the baseline scenario, that is  = 0=9 and  = 0=01, but also
let the ratio @D take digerent values between 0 and 5. We do that by ﬁxing D at
its baseline level and letting  vary. It should be stressed that the absolute value of the
variances have no egect on the interest-output correlation, only their ratio matters.
6.1.3 Results
Figure 5 depicts the optimal interest-output correlation as a function of  in the digerent
simulations. In all cases the correlation increases as  falls. That is, greater ﬁnancial
integration implies that the monetary authority should pursue counter-cyclical policies more
aggressively. As expected, greater @D pushes the optimal policy towards the counter-
cyclical end; however, the ﬁgure also demonstrates that the model still supports pro-cyclical
policies even when demand shocks are overwhelmingly more volatile than supply shocks,
provided that  is large enough.
6.2 Non-Tradable Sector
The monetary authority in the model manipulates the interest rate in order to inﬂuence
real wages. It does so through its egect on the exchange rate. The model with only tradable
goods assumes a complete pass-through from the exchange rate into domestic prices; as a
34result, ﬂuctuations in the exchange rate translate directly into ﬂuctuations in real wages.
Therefore, at ﬁrst glance, the assumption of a complete pass-through seems to be important
for generating pro-cyclical policies. We now relax this assumption by introducing a non-
tradable sector and reevaluate the results.
The main conclusions of this section are twofold. First, the introduction of a non-
tradable sector tends to shift the optimal monetary policy toward pro-cyclicality; and sec-
ond, the main message remains; greater ﬁnancial integration pushes the optimal monetary
policy from pro-cyclical to counter-cyclical.
6.2.1 Model’s Alteration






where FQ>w is consumption of non-tradables and FW>w is consumption of tradables. Firms







where OQ>w and OW>w are labor inputs in the non-tradable sector and the tradable sector,
respectively. Similarly, DQ>w and DW>w are total factor productivity in the two sectors; these
follow a stationary DU(1) process:
log(DQ>w) = (1  Q)Q + Q log(DQ>w31) + %Q>w























w31 + \W>w  FW>w




where SQ>w is the domestic currency price of the non-tradable good, and Sw is the consump-









The introduction of a non-tradable sector does not distort any of the equilibrium con-
ditions; hence, it is still the case that the ﬂexible wages equilibrium achieves the ﬁrst-best
allocation. Therefore, our solution strategy remains; we simply complement the system
with the eciency condition in the labor market.
6.2.2 Parameter Values
In steady state the share of spending on non-tradable goods is given by $; we set it to
0=5. This value is consistent with Stockman and Tesar (1995), and with evidence presented
in Burstein et al (2005) regarding the share of non-tradable goods in the CPI of various
countries.26
The non-tradable sector is typically more labor-intensive relative to the tradable sector,
this implies that Q A W. We leave W at its previous value, 0=7, and set Q to 0=8.
Productivity in the non-tradable has no terms of trade component, we therefore let it
display a somewhat greater degree of persistence than productivity in the tradable sector.
We set Q = 0=95 and let W take its previous value of 0=9. Similarly to Stockman and
26It should be noted that Burstein et al (2005) argue that the share of non-tradables is actually higher
since many tradable goods have non-traded components.
36Tesar (1995) we assume that the correlation of innovations across sectors is 0=5. Finally,
we assign the innovations the same standard deviation, Q = W = 0=01.
6.2.3 Results
We start by simulating the model without demand shocks. Figure 3 presents simulation
results for the baseline parameterization (line with triangle markers). The introduction of
a non-tradable sector reduces the interest-output correlation for any level of , suggesting
greater pro-cyclicality. The sensitivity analysis with respect to the non-tradable share, $,
yields similar results (See ﬁgure 6). The reason is that the non-tradable sector is similar to
the one-sector economy under ﬁnancial autarky, and for $ = 1 the two are in fact identical.
Therefore, as $ increases the optimal policy becomes more similar to the one under ﬁnancial
autarky.
Finally, we add demand shocks with time series parameters as reported in Table 2.
Figure 3 demonstrates that, as in the one-sector model, demand shocks push the optimal
policy toward counter-cyclicality (line with square markers).
The results are therefore robust to the introduction of a non-tradable sector even though
the passthrough from exchange rate movement to prices is now incomplete; as a country
enjoys greater ﬁnancial integration the optimal monetary policy shifts from pro-cyclical to
counter-cyclical.
7 Conclusion
This paper has documented that, in contrast to developed economies, developing countries
tend to follow pro-cyclical monetary policies. The paper then showed that a fairly stan-
dard New-Keynesian model supports this behavior as optimal, provided that developing
countries face greater barriers to the international ﬁnancial markets relative to developed
economies. Speciﬁcally, the model suggests that under full ﬁnancial integration the opti-
mal monetary policy is counter-cyclical, while if the economy is excluded from the inter-
37national ﬁnancial markets then the optimal policy is pro-cyclical. The model also suggests
that the transition from pro-cyclical to counter-cyclical policies is monotonic in the level
of integration. That is, greater integration pushes the optimal monetary policy toward
counter-cyclicality. These results are robust to a wide range of parameter values, utility
speciﬁcations, and to the introduction of demand shocks and a non-tradable sector.
Furthermore, in the model pro-cyclicality is coupled with policies that actively stabilize
the exchange rate. Often, countries are criticized for following such policies; nevertheless,
our model supports them as optimal.
Finally, an important insight from the paper is that the cyclical pattern alone may
not serve as an indicator for evaluating policies. It may, however, serve as an indicator
for the economic conditions under which policymakers operate. In terms of the model, a
pro-cyclical monetary policy might be a symptom of the inability to borrow and lend in
the international ﬁnancial markets. Therefore, advising countries to follow counter-cyclical
policies merely treats the symptom and may result in undesirable economic outcomes.
Instead, attention should be focused on measures for promoting integration in the in-
ternational ﬁnancial markets. Once integrated, policies would endogenously shift toward
counter-cyclicality.
8 Appendix 1: Determinacy of Equilibria
The results in the text ignore determinacy issues as they were derived by assuming a non-
sunspot equilibrium. This appendix shows that uniqueness can be achieved by including
the exchange rate in the interest rate rule with an arbitrary positive coecient, and that
such modiﬁcation does not agect any of the results discussed in the text.
388.1 Full Financial Integration
8.1.1 Determinacy of the Exchange Rate
Under full integration marginal utilities are perfectly smoothed, that is f e Fw + foe Ow  = 0.
Therefore, the interest rate rule (27) and the Euler equation (19) give:
K
1   + K
(1  D) e Dw  = Hw (e w+1)  e w
which characterizes the solution for the exchange rate. Under the non-sunspot equilibrium
we have:
e w  = 
K
1   + K
e Dw (36)
However, the Euler equation clearly has a unit root which opens the possibility for multiple
solutions. Speciﬁcally:
e w  = 
K
1   + K
e Dw + "w





Following Woodford (2003) we now show that by including the exchange rate with a positive
coecient in the interest rate rule, the monetary policy can support a unique equilibrium.
Consider the following rule:
e Uw  = d e Dw + ee w e A 0 (37)
Substituting e Uw into (19), and imposing f e Fw + foe Ow  = 0, gives:
Hw (e w+1)  = d e Dw + (1 + e)e w
Since the exchange rate is a non-predetermined endogenous variable, and since e A 0 this
equation has a unique solution. One can easily check that this solution is given by:
e w  = 
d
e + 1  D
e Dw
In order to recover the non-sunspot solution as given by equation (36), we must impose:
d =
K
1   + K
(e + 1  D) e A 0
39Therefore, any policy rule that satisﬁes this condition is able to determine the exchange rate
at the level of the non-sunspot equilibrium. Furthermore, after substituting the exchange
rate into the policy rule (37) and using the restrictions on d and e we recover the expression
for the interest rate, equation (27), as a reduced form solution. We now turn to show that
given (36) the rest of the system is uniquely determined, and that its solution is the same
as the non-sunspot equilibrium.
8.1.2 The Rest of the System
By using (36) to substitute for e w, and by manipulating equations (15), (17), (20), (21),
























This system has a unique solution if and only if \ has one eigenvalue inside the unit circle
and the other outside the unit circle. It is sucient to show that:
det(\) = 12 A 1
det(\)  WU(\) + 1 = (1  1)(2  1) ? 0





and therefore both eigenvalues have the same sign, and at least one of them lies outside
the unit circle. Also:
det(\)  WU(\) + 1 = 
(1  z)(1  z)
z
1   + K
(1 + K)(1  )
? 0
This rules out the possibility that both eigenvalues lie outside the unit circle since we have
already established that they both have the same sign. We can therefore conclude that the
solution is unique.
40Clearly, e lw = 0 solves the digerence equation, and using (15), we also get e $
w
w = 0. These
results indicate that this policy recovers the ﬂexible wages equilibrium by targeting wage
inﬂation, as suggested in the text. Given the solution for wages and the exchange rate
the rest of the variables, except for EW
w, are determined by a set of static relationships as
suggested by the non-sunspot solution. Finally, after solving for e Fw and e \w, foreign assets,
EW
w, are uniquely determined from the resource constraint since the coecient on EW
w31 is
greater than unity.
We therefore conclude that the monetary authority is able to recover the non-sunspot
allocation as a unique equilibrium while maintaining the results presented in the text.
8.2 Financial Autarky
We now show that under ﬁnancial autarky there exist interest rate rules of the form of
(37) that impose determinacy and recover the non-sunspot equilibrium. By substituting





































































(1  z)(1  z)
z
1   + o  fo + (of  f)
(1  )(1 + K)
A 0
This system has a unique solution if and only if \1 has one eigenvalue inside the unit circle
and two outside. The characteristic polynomial of \1 is given by:
S () = 
3 + D2
2 + D1 + D0










































For uniqueness it is sucient to show that either:27
1 + D2 + D1 + D0 A 0
1 + D2  D1 + D0 ? 0
|D2| A 3
or:
1 + D2 + D1 + D0 ? 0
1 + D2  D1 + D0 A 0
Given the parameters above:
1 + D2 + D1 + D0 = s
1  
1    f  fo
e












1    f  fo
D2 = 
1  
1    f  fo




f + fo ? 1  
In this case:
1  
1    f  fo
A 0
27See appendix C in Woodford (2003).
42and therefore it is immediate to show that:
1 + D2 + D1 + D0 A 0
1 + D2  D1 + D0 ? 0
|D2| A 3
for any e A 0.
Case 2:
f + fo A 1  
In this case:
1  
1    f  fo
? 0
Therefore:
1 + D2 + D1 + D0 ? 0
and:
1 + D2  D1 + D0 A 0









That is, we can always ﬁnd a e large enough such that policy rule (37) imposes uniqueness
on the economic system.
As in the case of full ﬁnancial integration we need to put restrictions on the relationship




1    f  fo
1  
(1  D) + e
¸
o  fo + of  f






The solution is given by:
e lw  = 0
e w  = 
o  fo + of  f
1   + o  fo + (of  f)
e Dw
43Given the solution for wages and the exchange rate the remaining variables are determined
by a set of static relationships as suggested by the non-sunspot solution.
Finally, after substituting the solution for the exchange rate into the policy rule (37)
and using the restrictions on d and e as given by (38), we recover the expression for the
interest rate, equation (31), as a reduced form solution. We therefore conclude that the
monetary authority is able to recover the non-sunspot allocation as a unique equilibrium
while maintaining the results presented in the text.
9 Appendix 2: Data
The data source for all series is the IFS. The paper uses quarterly data for the period
1974.1-2004.4 on short-term nominal interest rate, real GDP, CPI, the nominal exchange
rate, and the terms of trade.
For nominal interest rate we use either the central bank rate, line 60, or the interbank
market rate, line 60B, depending on data availability (see Table 3). For quarterly data we
average monthly observations in each quarter.
For real GDP we use volume indices, line 99BVR (seasonally adjusted) or 99BVP (not
seasonally adjusted), depending on data availability. For countries with no seasonal cor-
rection we adjust the series using X12 multiplicative method.
Inﬂation is measured using CPI, line 64. For quarterly data we average monthly obser-
vations. We then calculate inﬂation by the CPI growth rate during the last four quarters.
For the nominal exchange rates we use the nominal egective exchange rate, line NEC or
NEU. For countries with no data on the egective rates we use the nominal exchange rate
against the US Dollar, line AH. See Table 3 for the choice of series for each country. For
the estimation of equation (1), the rate of change of the exchange rate was calculated by
log digerences.
For terms of trade series we divide export unit value, line 74, by import unit value, line
75. These were used for evaluating the persistence of the terms of trade. See Table 3 for
44the autocorrelations of the terms of trade.
For the cyclical components we remove HP trends from the interest rate, log GDP,
inﬂation, the exchange rate, and its rate of change. We use a smoothing parameter of 1600
in all cases.
We restrict our sample to include countries with ﬂoating or dirty-ﬂoating exchange rate
regimes with at least 20 consecutive observations. In addition, we remove observations in
periods of annual CPI inﬂation of more than 100 percent.
The classiﬁcation of exchange rate regimes is based on Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger
(2005). They assign a ﬁve-way index to each country-year observation. The value 1 indi-
cates an inconclusive regime, 2 is ﬂoat, 3 is dirty ﬂoat, 4 is either dirty ﬂoat or a crawling
peg, and 5 indicates a ﬁxed exchange rate regime. We include observations that take the
values 2 or 3; however, we also include observations that take the value 1 or 4 if they follow
directly after periods of ﬂoating or dirty-ﬂoating (i.e. indexed by 2 or 3) and return to
these regimes immediately afterwards. In other words, observations indexed by 1 or 4 are
allowed to the extent that they do not open or close the sample period.
Table 3 reports the resulting sample periods for each country. The table also com-
plements Table 1 by reporting country speciﬁc interest-output correlations and output
coecients from the estimation of the interest rate rules.
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50Figure 1: Country Correlations Between

























































































































































































































































51Figure 2: The Labor Market — A Positive Productivity Shock*
* Labor supply is parameterized by GHH preferences.
52Figure 3: Interest-Output Correlation As a Function of ,
Baseline Parameterization*











One Sector, No Demand Shocks
One Sector, w/ Demand Shocks
Two Sectors, No Demand Shocks
Two Sectors, w/ Demand Shocks
* Each data point is the average correlation over 10,000 simulations, each 100 periods long.
53Figure 4: Interest-Output Correlation As a Function of ,
Sensitivity Analysis*
(A) Curvature of Preferences,  (B) Curvature of Disutility from Labor , y
































(C) Labor Income Share,  (D) Probability of Wage Change, 1z



























w = 0.75 (Duration = 4M)
1- [
w = 0.5   (Duration = 2Q)
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w = 0.25 (Duration = 4Q)
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w = 0.2   (Duration = 5Q)
(E) Elasticity of Substitution of Labor Skills,  (F) Auto Correlation, D











T = 3     (Markup = 50%)
T = 6     (Markup = 20%)
T = 11   (Markup = 10%)
T = 101 (Markup = 1%)



















* Each data point is the average correlation over 10,000 simulations, each 100 periods long.
54Figure 5: Interest-Output Correlation As a Function of ,
A Model with Demand Shocks (= 0=9)*


























* Each data point is the average correlation over 10,000 simulations, each 100 periods long.
55Figure 6: Interest-Output Correlation As a Function of ,
A Two-Sector Model (no demand shocks)*
















* Each data point is the average correlation over 10,000 simulations, each 100 periods long.
56Table 1: Cyclicality of Short-Term Interest Rate by Country Group*
Panel A: Interest-Output Correlation
Sig. Sig.
Average Positive Negative Positive** Negative**
Developed Economies 0.26 13 2 7 0
Developing Countries -0.18 5 10 0 5
Panel B: Output Coecient in Interest Rule Estimation,  = 0, OLS
Sig. Sig. Panel Regression
Average Positive Negative Positive** Negative** | P-value
Developed Economies 0.22 11 4 7 2 0.18 0.000
Developing Countries -0.33 3 12 0 5 -0.11 0.000
Panel C: Output Coecient in Interest Rule Estimation,  6= 0, TSLS
Sig. Sig. Panel Regression
Average Positive Negative Positive** Negative** | P-value
Developed Economies 0.13 8 7 3 1 0.27 0.002
Developing Countries -0.14 4 11 0 3 -0.17 0.080
* Output refers to real GDP and interest rates are either the central bank’s rate or the interbank market rate,
depending on data availability. All statistics are calculated using the cyclical components of the variables;
these are measured by the deviation of the variables from HP trend.
** 5 percent signiﬁcance level.
57Table 2: Baseline Parameter Values
Preferences: Discount factor,  0=99
Curvature,  2
Elasticity of labor supply, 1
y31 1=67
Labor Market: Elasticity of substitution,  6
Wage rigidity, z 0=75
Technology: Labor income share,  0=7
Productivity: Autocorrelation, D 0=9
Std. of innovations, D 0=01
Portfolio adj. cost: Second derivative at SS,  varies
SS assets, EW
vv 0
Demand shocks: Autocorrelation,  0=9
Std. of innovations,  0=01
Non-tradable sector: Non-tradable share, $ 0=5
Autocorrelation, Q 0=95
Std. of innovations, Q 0=01
Correlation of innovations, Q>W 0=5
Labor income share, Q 0=8
58Table 3: Complementary Table
OLS TSLS Interest Ex. Rate TOT
e U>e \ P-val. | P-val. | P-val. Series* Series** Auto-cor. Sample
Developed Economies
Australia 0.45 0.000 0.46 0.001 0.81 0.734 60B NEC 0.97 84.1-04.4
Canada 0.52 0.000 0.51 0.000 0.48 0.001 60 NEU 0.88 76.1-04.4
France 0.34 0.139 0.41 0.005 0.85 0.181 60 NEU NA 74.1-78.4
Germany*** -0.13 0.485 -0.06 0.720 -0.45 0.203 60 NEU 0.88 91.1-98.4
Greece -0.34 0.055 -0.08 0.025 -0.20 0.066 60 NEU 0.90 83.1-91.1
Israel 0.11 0.339 0.14 0.417 0.12 0.601 60 NEC 0.85 86.2-04.4
Italy 0.08 0.542 0.00 0.995 0.32 0.474 60 NEU 0.99 80.1-93.4
Japan 0.33 0.000 0.11 0.068 0.31 0.019 60 NEU 0.95 74.1-04.4
Korea 0.24 0.263 0.72 0.000 0.71 0.001 60 AH 0.85 80.1-85.4
Singapore 0.02 0.947 -0.22 0.044 -0.32 0.017 60B NEC 0.13 94.1-98.4
Spain 0.17 0.177 0.55 0.159 -0.63 0.643 60 NEU 0.97 77.1-93.4
Switzerland 0.63 0.000 0.37 0.000 -0.15 0.621 60 NEU NA 82.1-04.4
UK 0.41 0.000 -0.07 0.473 -0.03 0.814 60B NEU 0.84 87.1-04.4
US 0.34 0.000 0.09 0.045 0.24 0.401 60 NEU 0.89 74.1-04.4
Euro Area 0.78 0.000 0.42 0.000 -0.12 0.830 60 NEU NA 99.1-04.4
Developing Countries
Chile 0.16 0.280 0.21 0.249 0.33 0.181 60 NEC NA 93.2-04.4
Colombia 0.24 0.110 -0.13 0.699 1.33 0.691 60 NEC 0.57 94.1-04.4
Croatia -0.45 0.009 -0.15 0.006 -0.28 0.014 60 NEC NA 97.1-04.4
Czech Rep. -0.15 0.476 -0.26 0.129 -0.21 0.468 60 NEC NA 95.4-01.4
Ecuador -0.47 0.004 -1.79 0.006 -0.15 0.933 60 NEC NA 91.1-99.4
Georgia -0.26 0.263 -0.62 0.312 -1.06 0.128 60B AH NA 00.1-04.4
Indonesia -0.38 0.046 -0.42 0.312 -0.45 0.648 60 AH NA 98.1-04.4
Kyrgyz Rep. 0.04 0.875 -0.03 0.913 -0.26 0.585 60B AH NA 00.1-04.4
Mexico 0.16 0.332 0.39 0.276 0.81 0.203 60B AH NA 95.1-04.4
Peru -0.50 0.001 -0.87 0.015 -0.41 0.539 60 AH NA 92.2-02.4
Philippines -0.18 0.353 -0.02 0.955 -0.09 0.797 60 NEC 0.53 97.1-03.4
Poland 0.29 0.074 0.32 0.073 0.33 0.337 60 NEC 0.51 95.1-04.4
South Africa -0.28 0.104 -1.08 0.000 -1.31 0.001 60 NEC 0.91 96.1-04.4
Thailand -0.16 0.279 -0.04 0.279 -0.01 0.894 60 AH 0.94 93.1-04.4
Turkey -0.69 0.000 -0.46 0.002 -0.62 0.001 60 AH 0.72 99.1-04.4
* Line 60 is the central bank discount rate, line 60B is the interbank market rate.
** Lines NEC and NEU are nominal eective rates. Line AH is the nominal rate against the US Dollar.
*** Data for Germany start in 1991.1, however the calculation of annual inﬂation takes 4 observations and
therefore the estimation of the interest rate rules starts in 92.1.
59